Digital Conflict

By Kevin Coleman

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Kevin Coleman

3 cyber scenarios worth considering

The introduction of cyberspace as the fifth domain of conflict has far reaching implications that have not yet been fully explored nor were appropriate policies created to provide operational guidance for our military and government leaders. Adding to an already complex issue is that fact that military planners and strategists do not have decades of well documented past actions that can be drawn upon as a guide in the prosecution of military cyber action. There is little doubt that military cyber capabilities are impacting the rules of engagement, military doctrine and international laws and policies.

During the past decade I have been involved in a number of cyber conflict planning exercises for training and research purposes. I recently was asked for my opinion on three specific scenarios involving offensive cyber operations that are very interesting. Here they are:

Scenario 1. The United States, as part of a NATO force or operation, launches a offensive cyber action from a facility in Maryland that targeted military systems in Syria, which is trying to quash the uprising. Would the cyberattack being launched from U.S. soil make the launching facility in Maryland included in the battlespace? Does the cyberattack command and control and launch facility being in the United States automatically make the U.S. mainland a legitimate target for physical or cyber retaliation?

Scenario 2. The United States experiences a fairly disruptive cyberattack on its infrastructure that black-outs a city of 60,000 for days. Would the United States be within its rights to launch a retaliatory strike, cyber or physical, against compromised systems in Venezuela that were used as an unwilling or unknowing intermediary in the cyberattack that was attributed to forces in Iran?

Scenario 3. A financial institution within the United States experiences a cyberattack on its online banking systems. The financial institution’s internal IT staff back-trace the attack to Argentina. As their servers are about to crash due to the malicious traffic, the IT staff decides to return fire and launch a retaliatory cyber strike against the top traffic sources in Argentina. Do they have the right of self-defense? (Note: This already happened back in 2011.)

These three scenarios illustrate the complexities of modern conflict now that cyberattacks have entered in to the equation. Recent planning of cyberattack scenarios such as these for training purposes resulted in the conclusion that it is easy to see how a room full of lawyers and international policy experts would be needed during the planning of any real-world cyberattack. These issues must be investigated, debated and answers agreed upon now before they come up in the heat of cyber conflict.

Posted by Kevin Coleman on Jan 17, 2013 at 11:02 AM


Reader Comments

Thu, Jan 17, 2013 mikk0j .

Kevin, I hate to speculate what would happen in scenarios defined. I believe, 1st & foremost - there is NO massive, traditionally thinkable "launching a offensive cyber action" scenario existing. There is no need or possibility for it. The 'cyberwep' differs here quite much from kinetic ones, and yes - there is NO counterpart either. So we can forget that, for now. The set of TTP:s involved with cyber capabilities shall require, for time being, a vast amount of information exploitation, intelligence, development and co-ordination capabilities that enters step-by-step within the theater of operations. Automation shall enable execution of many parts on its tasking overall, but it cannot be simply called a "launching of operation", merely as tasking is certain amount tactical movements. Yes, there are technical tasks as well, like combining information and building tactical payloads for weapons delivery platform(s). Talking about the locations involved in operation makes a very little sense. The operational capability shall extend from far reach of the decision making cycle, dashboards and UI:s towards the heat of the kinetic battle space using UAVs, ELINT intercepting capabilities and USB sticks in parallel able to connect via WLANs to neared available piece of hardwire providing the cyber capabilities for requested task. Just as an example of the cyber domains depth and width to compare for any traditional "artillery". What is cyber weapons platform? Its service architecture, such similar we can find in many of the corporation applications now served through clouds. No significant high-level architectural difference there. It’s relatively hard to realize that U.S. nor than any other country is capable for exact attribution of 'enemy within'. One of the problem cyber capabilities bring to the table is that offensive deployment can stay dormant in the physical country, datacenter or geographical area for years without a notice and then suddenly brought online to perform the high yield operation as planned. Nation can be "occupied" before "it is"; so no warning before wiping down the decision making data needed to make the decisions. Savvy? This gives very little time for reaction and even less for the adversary targeting. Similarly, the capability can be dismantled within seconds and by leaving no trace only pushing defensive side to start investigation doomed to fail and consuming resources. While this may continue 4-5 times during a week with different kind of objectives, targets and aftermath - potentially forcing decision makers to radical judgments to close some networks harming the society badly. What if the adversary deploys from well-known and important institution that 'can't be shut down'? Our integrated society, unfortunately, saws itself to knee. There is no sense making of scenarios as cyber warfare offers simultaneously defensive and offensive capabilities and different movement-counter movements may happen within blink of eye.

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