Interagency turf battles put U.S. defense technologies at risk

Weapons and other defense-related technologies are in danger of falling into the wrong hands, according to a recent report by the Government Accountability Office.

GAO’s report, titled “Export Controls: Fundamental Re-examination of System Is Needed to Help Protect Critical Technologies,” concluded that poor interagency coordination, inefficiencies in processing licensing applications, and a lack of systematic assessments creates security vulnerabilities in the U.S. export control system of weapons and defense-related technology. The report calls for the executive and legislative branches to reexamine current programs and processes.

Multiple agencies are involved in the control and protection of critical technologies, including the Defense, State, Commerce, Homeland Security, Treasury, Energy and Justice departments. Poor coordination among the agencies involved in export controls has resulted in jurisdictional disputes and enforcement challenges, particularly between State and Commerce. These disputes allow exporters to decide whether to approach Commerce or State for approval, increasing the risk that critical items will be exported without an appropriate review.

The interagency disagreements also create challenges for enforcement agencies in carrying out inspections, investigations and prosecutions. State’s backlog of licensing applications topped 10,000 cases at the end of fiscal 2006.

Finally, neither State nor Commerce has systematically assessed the overall effectiveness of their export control programs nor identified corrective actions that may be needed — despite changes in the national security environment, according to GAO.

GAO identified eight sensitive technology programs that could be affected if improvements are not made in the export control system:

  • The Military Critical Technologies Program run DOD, which identifies and assesses technologies critical for the U.S. military.
  • The Dual-Use Export Control System managed by Commerce (the lead agency), and State, the Central Intelligence Agency, DOD Energy, Homeland Security, and Justice, which regulates export of arms by U.S. companies.
  • The Arms Export Control System managed by State (lead agency), and DOD, Homeland Security and Justice.
  • The Foreign Military Sales Program managed by State and DOD (leads), and Homeland Security.
  • The National Disclosure Policy Process managed by State, DOD and the intelligence community; it determines the release of classified military information, including weapons and military technologies, to foreign governments.
  • The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States managed by the Treasury Department (lead), Commerce, DOD, Homeland Security, Justice, Energy and the director of National Intelligence; it investigates the impact of foreign acquisitions on national security and suspends or prohibits acquisitions that might threaten national security.
  • The National Industrial Security Program managed by DOD; it ensures that contractors, including foreign contractors, safeguard classified information in their possession.
  • The Anti-Tamper Policy managed by DOD, which establishes anti-tamper techniques on weapons systems.

Reader Comments

Wed, Jun 17, 2009

If you think this is bad, you need to examine the ERP projects DEAMS, GFEB, and Navy. I am currently working on one of these programs. There is liitle coordination between system developers and operations. Coordination noccurs at the executive level, but the futher down the chain there is almost none. The assumptions seems to be we are going to dump this on the users and forget about it. I don't know if any of these ERPs will work. Everyone seems to be building silos around there area of responsibility and are too afraid to communicate to other developersw, business analyst and operations. I now know why so many of these projects fail. We have window dresssing of SES coordination and everyone else is covering their rear ends. So when if fails, everyone can point to someone else. Classic circle jerk formation in the DoD, again. SNAFU! I wish I could sign this and talk to you.

Please post your comments here. Comments are moderated, so they may not appear immediately after submitting. We will not post comments that we consider abusive or off-topic.

Your Name:(optional)
Your Email:(optional)
Your Location:(optional)
Comment:
Please type the letters/numbers you see above

Highlights from the current issue

eSeminar

  • Where Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity Meet

    We invite you to attend the third event in this three-part series on Cybersecurity. 1105 Government Information Group will present a panel of government and cybersecurity experts, including Jeffrey Carr, cyber strategies consultant and author of Inside Cyber Warfare; Dean Lindstrom, strategic cybersecurity architect and CEO of Cyberström LLC; and Dr. George Stein, director of the Cyberspace and Information Operations Study Center, Air War College, U.S. Air Force, in this editorial webcast on Tuesday, April 13 at 11 a.m., where they will discuss the cyberwarfare threat to both industry and government, as well as strategies to consolidate the wider cybersecurity mission. Read more